Arizona v. Johnson, 07-1122
01/26/09, U.S.
Holding: Police officers conducting traffic stops may order passengers out of vehicle and conduct a “pat-down” frisk in the absence of reasonable suspicion that passengers are engaged in criminal activity, as long as officers have reason to believe that the passenger may be armed and dangerous. Here, Defendant was a back-seat passenger in a car stopped for an insurance-related traffic violation. The officers conducting the stop were gang investigators, and officer’s conversation with Defendant gave her reason to believe that he was a member of a violent street gang whose members were frequently armed. Officer asked Defendant to get out of the car in order to question him further. Because officer suspected that Defendant was armed, she immediately patted him down for safety when he exited the car, and found a gun.
Court held that encounter was not “consensual,” and officers who conduct routine traffic stops may frisk drivers and passengers they have lawfully detained if officers have reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous. Brendlin v. California, 127 S.Ct. 2400 (2007). The temporary seizure of driver and passengers ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for the duration of the stop. Normally, the stop ends when police have no further need to control the scene, and inform the driver and passengers they are free to leave. Here, nothing in officer’s conversation with Defendant would have suggested that he was free to leave, so he remained seized when officer conducted pat-down.
Following reasoning in Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005), Court also held that Fourth Amendment allows officers to ask questions about drugs or make other inquiries unrelated to the traffic violation justifying the initial stop. This does not “convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure,” so long as the inquiries unrelated to the traffic stop “do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.” Held, Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision reversed and remanded.
Note: The Court in Johnson reaffirmed the general rule that, with the exception of occupants in automobiles that have been lawfully stopped, a valid investigatory “stop and frisk” requires: 1) reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is committed or has committed a crime; and, to proceed from a stop to a frisk, 2) reasonable suspicion the person stopped is armed and dangerous. Johnson, slip op. at 1. In other words, a police officer involved in a “consensual encounter” cannot take safety measures such as patting someone down even if they have reason to believe the person is armed and dangerous. See State v. Atkins, 834 N.E.2d 1028 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005) (officer safety is always a legitimate concern, but standing alone it cannot form the basis for a valid investigatory stop; a lawful stop, based on objective facts and reasonable suspicion, is the predicate for a pat down); Briggs v. State, 873 N.E.2d 129 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007) (since police officers’ encounter with D was “consensual,” Fourth Amendment was not implicated and they had no authority to restrict D’s movement in any way); Malone v. State, 882 N.E.2d 784 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008) (at time police officers seized gun from D, they did not have information leading them to believe D had been convicted of any crime, which could render him a serious violent felon or his possession of a weapon illegal).
