Waddington v. Sarausad, 07-772
01/21/09, U.S.
Holding: Ninth Circuit erred in granting habeas relief to Defendant based on unclear accomplice liability jury instructions because state-court decision denying post-conviction relief did not result in an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A defendant challenging the constitutionality of a jury instruction that quotes a state statute must show both that the instruction was ambiguous and that there was a reasonable likelihood jury applied the instruction in a way that relieved State of its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991).
Here, Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder for his role as the driver in a gang-related, drive-by shooting. In closing argument, prosecutor stressed Defendant’s knowledge of a shooting, noting how he drove at the scene, that he knew that fighting alone would not regain respect for his gang, and that he was “in for a dime, in for a dollar.” On appeal, Defendant argued that prosecutor’s improper argument may have led jury to convict him as an accomplice to murder based solely on a finding that he had anticipated that an assault would occur. Jury instruction parroted the state statute’s language, requiring jury to find Defendant guilty as an accomplice “in the commission of the [murder]” if he acted “with knowledge that [his conduct would] promote or facilitate the commission of the [murder].” Because Washington courts’ conclusion that jury instruction was unambiguous was not objectively unreasonable, Ninth Circuit should have ended its § 2254(d)(1) inquiry there. However, even if the instruction were ambiguous, there was no evidence of ultimate juror confusion and Washington courts reasonably applied precedent when they found no “reasonable likelihood” that the prosecutor’s closing argument caused jury to apply instruction in a way that relieved State of its burden to prove every element of crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Prosecutor consistently argued that Defendant was guilty as an accomplice because he acted with knowledge that he was facilitating a drive-by shooting. Held, grant of habeas relief reversed and remanded. Souter, Stevens, and Ginsburg, JJ., DISSENT, arguing that uncertain, ambiguous instruction from trial judge was underscored by prosecutor’s “confounding” argument that included a “clearly erroneous statement of law.” As a result, jurors did not understand the state of mind prosecution had to prove for accomplice liability.
Note: See Peterson v. State, 699 N.E.2d 701 (Ind.Ct.App. 1998)(reversible error for failure to give accused’s tendered instructions which went beyond the bare language of Indiana’s accomplice liability statute, I.C. 35-41-2-4 and Pattern Instruction 2.11).
