March 2009 Posts

Shotts v. Indiana

March 12, 2009, No. 71A03-0808-CR400

Attorney Anthony V. Luber

Holding: In a unanimous decision, the Indiana Court of Appeals overturned Appellant’s conviction. The Court held that since the out-of-state affiant merely alleged that the appellant had committed a crime, the warrant invalidated Appellant’s arrest pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Further, the Court declined to apply the “good faith exception” to allow the admission of evidence found on Appellant during arrest. The Court held that even though arresting officers acted in good faith in executing the arrest warrant, since the out-of-state officer knew or should have known that his testimony was insufficient to support a probable cause determination, the exclusionary rule applies, and the police conduct falls outside of the good faith exception.

Here, an arrest warrant was issued for Appellant in Hunstsville, Alabama. An Alabama Detective had reason to believe that Appellant had relocated to Mishawaka, IN. He contacted a Detective in St. Joseph County and asked that St. Joseph authorities serve the arrest warrant, and Alabama would subsequently seek to extradite. The St. Joseph Detective confirmed the warrant through NCIC, and Appellant was arrested and charged with a class A misdemeanor, carrying a handgun without a license and a class C felony, carrying a handgun without a license with a prior felony. Appellant filed a motion to suppress which the trial court denied. Appellant was convicted at a bench trial, but preserved his claim of error. Citing Kinnaird v. State, 242 N.E.2d 500, the Court of Appeals held that the arrest warrant issued in Alabama was invalid because it merely alleged that the Appellant was engaged in unlawful conduct, and was not supported by enough underlying facts and circumstances to allow a neutral and detached magistrate to draw his own conclusion as the existence of the probable cause.

In rejecting the State’s argument that the “good faith exception” applies, the Court stated, “to allow law enforcement to insulate the State from the operation of the exclusionary rule by simply creating one degree of separation between the officer acting in bad faith and the officer executing the warrant would serve no deterrent effect whatsoever.”

Note: The Court indicated that while the U.S. Supreme Court has been slowly been reducing the protections offered by the Fourth Amendment, Indiana is not necessarily inclined to reduce such protections.

Thursday, March 19th, 2009 | Posted in Indiana Court of Appeals | No Comments »

Dean v. State, 27A04-0807-CR-409

4th Dist., 02-27-09, Ind.App.

Attorney: C. Robert Rittman

Holding: Trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion for discharge under Criminal Rule 4(c), because he failed to object to trial settings resulting from trial court’s congestion order. Defendant established that trial court’s three separate congestion orders were factually inaccurate, and thus established a prima facie case adequate for discharge because of the 388-day total delay attributable to the State. James v. State, 716 N.E.2d 935 (Ind. 1999). However, the February 12, 2007, congestion order set a trial date outside the one-year time limit, and Defendant did not object to the setting of this trial date. Rather, Defendant waited until four days before jury trial to file his motion for discharge. Requirement that a defendant object to a trial date set after a Criminal Rule 4 deadline and move for discharge facilitates compliance by trial courts with speedy trial requirement. Brown v. State, 725 N.E.2d 823 (Ind. 2000). Accordingly, if the time period provided by the rule has not expired and a trial date is set for a date beyond that period, a timely objection must be made. Id. While Clark v. State, 659 N.E.2d 548 (Ind. 1995), and Bridwell v. State, 659 N.E.2d 552 (Ind. 1995), do not directly place time constraints on a defendant’s right to challenge a trial court’s congestion order, Court found language in Brown controlling. Because Defendant did not object to setting of trial dates, any claim of a violation of Criminal Rule 4 resulting from challenged congestion orders was waived. Held, judgment affirmed.

Tuesday, March 17th, 2009 | Posted in Indiana Court of Appeals | No Comments »

5th Dist., 02-09-09, Ind.App. 900 N.E.2d 820

Attorney: Dale Arnett

State v. Brown, 38A05-0810-CR-573

Holding: Trial court properly granted Defendant’s Motion to Suppress. The reasonableness of a search or seizure under Indiana Constitution may turn on a balance of : (1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, (2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and (3) the extent of law enforcement needs. Here, police received noise complaints about a party on private property. The police spoke to the party organizers about the excessive noise and the organizers resolved the issue to the officer’s satisfaction. As officers were leaving, Defendant pulled into the private lane and parked his truck. Upon one officer approaching Defendant and asking for identification, Defendant became nervous and gave two names and birth dates which turned out to be fake. Another officer recognized Defendant and determined he was HTV. Trial court properly found that because Defendant had not yet arrived at the party when the officers had informed the persons present at the party of the noise complaint, there was no need to interact with Defendant and thus no need to ascertain his identity. In other words, the request was random. Thus, even though State argued that the police encounter with Defendant was consensual, State did not sustain its burden of proving the suppression order was contrary to law. Held, judgment affirmed.

Tuesday, March 17th, 2009 | Posted in Indiana Court of Appeals | No Comments »

George v. State, 73A05-0808-CR-503

5th Dist., 02-24-09, Ind.App.

Attorney: Stephen Gerald Gray

Holding: Morphene tablets, having been lawfully seized pursuant to an inventory search, were not subject to an additional search within meaning of Fourth Amendment when police officer contacted a pharmacist to determine their chemical composition. Thus, trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence obtained from inventory search of Defendant’s vehicle. To safeguard against a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence, an inventory search must be conducted in conformity with standard police procedures that are rationally designed to meet the objectives that justify the search in the first place and that sufficiently limit the discretion of the officer. Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427 (Ind. 1993). Here, Defendant did not challenge officer’s decision to open the pill bottle, because sheriff department’s inventory search policy requires that closed or locked containers be opened, and such a policy does not offend the Fourth Amendment. However, policy was silent regarding whether an officer may determine the chemical composition of all medications found inside a vehicle during an inventory search. Morphene tablets had already been lawfully seized, thus additional testing did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Bastin v. State, 510 N.E.2d 229 (Ind.Ct.App. 1987). Moreover, Article 1, Section 11 of Indiana Constitution was not violated, because officer’s decision to open pill bottle and to contact pharmacist when faced with a pill bottle that lacked a prescription label was reasonable. Held, judgment affirmed.

Tuesday, March 17th, 2009 | Posted in Indiana Court of Appeals | No Comments »