April 2009 Posts

State judges’ erroneous denials of peremptory strikes do not violate federal Constitution

Rivera v. Illinois, 07-9995

03-31-09, U.S.

Holding: In the absence of a showing that a juror was biased or was challengeable for cause, a state judge’s failure to give a defendant all the peremptories provided by state law “is not a matter of federal constitutional concern.” Thus, states can decide for themselves whether this type of mistake is a “structural” error or whether it requires automatic reversal. Here, trial judge seated a juror who was the target of a defense peremptory challenge but who could not have been removed for cause. The judge was concerned that Defendant’s peremptory challenge was discriminatory. Illinois Supreme Court found that trial judge erroneously refused to give effect to Defendant’s peremptory challenge, but applied harmless-error analysis and affirmed Rivera’s conviction. It is well established that in the reverse situation, when a juror is discriminatorily struck who should have been seated, there is no “harmless error” analysis and the error is reversible per se.

U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that, despite the long history of peremptory challenges’ role in ensuring the fairness of jury trials, peremptory challenges are not an indispensible feature of the fair jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. “Just as state law controls the existence and exercise of peremptory challenges, so state law determines the consequences of an erroneous denial of such a challenge.” Defendant got a fair trial and was not entitled to reversal just because his peremptory challenge was erroneously denied. Held, judgment affirmed.

Monday, April 27th, 2009 | Posted in Indiana Supreme Court | No Comments »

Guilty pleas – failure to object to breached plea subjected to plain error rule

Puckett v. United States, 07-9712

03-25-09, U.S.

Holding: A defendant who did not contemporaneously object in federal district court to an alleged breach of a plea agreement by the government may not obtain relief on that claim on appeal unless he is able to satisfy the rigorous requirements of the plain-error rule. To establish plain error, a party must demonstrate that there was error, that it was plain in the sense of being obvious, that it affected the party’s substantial rights, and that a failure to correct it would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Here, during the three years between Defendant’s guilty plea and his sentencing, Defendant committed another crime. Base on the new crime, prosecutors withdrew their support for a sentence reduction which they agreed to as part of an earlier agreement. At no time during the sentencing proceeding did defense counsel assert that the government was reneging on its promise. When Defendant raised the issue on appeal, the Fifth Circuit applied the plain error rule and found that Defendant would not have received the reduction even had the government asked for it and thus reversal was not required.

The Supreme Court rejected Defendant’s argument that the prosecutor’s failure to hold up their end of a plea bargain retroactively voids the deal by undermining the knowing and voluntary nature of Defendant’s guilty plea. Although a breach of a plea agreement opens the door to a number of possible remedies, one of which might be rescissions, this is not the same as saying the contract never existed. Defaulting on a plea agreement is also not a “structural” error that is unamenable to harmless-error analysis. Held, judgment of the Fifth Circuit affirmed; Souter and Stevens, JJ., dissenting on basis that the plain error standard applied; however, the harm from the breach in this case certainly cast doubt on the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings, given that people have a right to expect the government to abide by its promises; Souter added that the prejudice should be gauged not by the sentence, but by Defendant’s relinquishment of his trial rights in exchange for an empty promise.

Monday, April 27th, 2009 | Posted in Indiana Supreme Court | No Comments »

Speedy trial – delays caused by assigned counsel attributable to defendant

Vermont v. Brillon, 08-88

03-09-09, U.S.

Holding: The Vermont Supreme Court erred in finding that a three-year delay between charges and trial violated the Sixth Amendment. Some of the facts a court should weigh when determining whether there has been a speedy trial violation are the length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. When considering the reason for a delay, assigned counsel, just as retained counsel, act on behalf of their clients, and delays sought by counsel are ordinarily attributable to the defendants they represent. Because the attorney is the defendant’s agent when acting, or failing to act, in furtherance of the litigation, delay caused by the defendant’s counsel is also charged against the defendant. Assigned counsel are generally not state actors for purposes of a speedy-trial claim. The general rule attributing to the defendant delay caused by assigned counsel is not absolute. Delay resulting from a systemic breakdown in the public defender system could be charged to the State. Moreover, time gaps resulting from the trial court’s failure to appoint replacement counsel with dispatch may be attributable to the State.

Here, it took three years to bring Defendant to trial after being charged. During this time, at least six different attorneys were appointed to represent Defendant. The Vermont Supreme Court found the delay during the representation by the first two public defenders was attributable to Defendant who “fired” the first attorney and threatened to kill the second. However, the Vermont Supreme Court found that most of the delay after the first two attorneys was caused by the subsequent public defenders failing to move the case forward. The Vermont Supreme Court made a fundamental error in attributing to the State delays caused by the failure of several assigned counsel to move the case forward and in failing adequately to take into account the role of Defendant’s disruptive behavior in the overall balance. The period of each counsel’s representation should not have been treated discretely. Absent Defendant’s deliberate efforts to force the withdrawal of his first two public defenders, no speedy-trial issue would have arisen. Thus, the effect of the earlier events should have been factored into the court’s analysis of subsequent delay. Moreover, the Vermont Supreme Court made no determination, and nothing in the record suggests, that institutional problems caused any part of the delay in this case. Held, judgment of Vermont Supreme Court reversed; Breyer and Stevens, JJ., dissenting on basis that cert. was granted improvidently because the Vermont Supreme Court’s decision could be read attributing the delays to the defender general’s office for not properly assigning counsel rather than to counsel for failing to move the case forward.

Monday, April 27th, 2009 | Posted in Uncategorized | No Comments »

Good faith exception – exclusionary rule still exists in Indiana

Shotts v. State, 71A03-0808-CR-400

3rd Dist., 03-12-09, Ind.App.

Attorney: Anthony Luber

Holding: Trial court abused its discretion by admitting a gun seized from Defendant’s person when Indiana police executed an illegal Alabama arrest warrant. Where an affidavit merely alleges that the defendant engaged in unlawful conduct, the affidavit falls far short of the constitutional standard requiring enough underlying facts and circumstances to allow a neutral and detached magistrate to draw his own conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Here, Alabama police notified Indiana police that there was an arrest warrant for Defendant, whom they believed was living in Mishawaka. After confirming through NCIC that there was an active Alabama warrant, the police executed the warrant. During Defendant’s arrest, the police found a gun on his person. The affidavit supporting the Alabama warrant stated only that an investigator testified under oath that he had probable cause that Defendant received stolen property. Because the affiant did not provide any facts from which a neutral magistrate could have drawn his own conclusion as to probable cause, the arrest warrant is invalid pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Although the Indiana police were acting in good faith by relying on the Alabama warrant, the affidavit supporting the warrant was so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in the warrant’s validity entirely unreasonable. Thus, the Alabama officers were not acting in good faith. To allow law enforcement to insulate the State from the operation of the exclusionary rule by simply creating one degree of separation between the officer acting in bad faith and the officer executing the warrant would serve no deterrent effect whatsoever. Therefore, the good faith exception does not apply.

Moreover, the gun is clearly inadmissible pursuant to our Indiana constitutional analysis, which places the burden on the State to demonstrate that each relevant intrusion was reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances. To the extent that the U.S. Supreme Court is limiting the viability of the exclusionary rule pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, the Court of Appeals is not convinced that our supreme court will follow suit and diminish safeguards historically recognized pursuant to Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Held, judgment reversed.

Monday, April 27th, 2009 | Posted in Indiana Court of Appeals | No Comments »

Reasonable suspicion to detain juvenile – proximity to open beer cans

In re J.D. v. State, 49A04-0808-JV-490

4th Dist., 03-09-09, Ind.App. 902 N.E.2d 293

Attorney: Karen Celestino-Horseman

Holding: Juvenile court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence he claims was obtained in violation of article 1, section 11 of Indiana Constitution and Fourth Amendment to United States Constitution. Police officers observed juvenile sitting in very close proximity to open beer cans, with what appeared to be marijuana strewn about on the ground.

Officers instructed all individuals on front porch to walk out to the curb and sit down with their legs straight, and advised that they were going to administer portable breath tests. Defendant took off running, and was ultimately adjudicated delinquent for acts that would constitute two counts of resisting law enforcement and one count of battery on a police officer if they had been committed by an adult.

Defendant argued that police took Defendant into custody when they directed him to sit on curb and did so without reasonable suspicion to justify the detention. Court disagreed, noting that although officers did not witness Defendant actually drinking beer, the fact that he is a minor, coupled with his close proximity to open cans of beer on porch, was sufficient to cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe that criminal activity had or was about to occur, thus giving rise to requisite reasonable suspicion under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Thus, the detention of Defendant did not offend Fourth Amendment principles or article 1, section 11 of Indiana Constitution. Held, judgment affirmed.

Monday, April 27th, 2009 | Posted in Indiana Court of Appeals | No Comments »

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