Puckett v. United States, 07-9712
03-25-09, U.S.
Holding: A defendant who did not contemporaneously object in federal district court to an alleged breach of a plea agreement by the government may not obtain relief on that claim on appeal unless he is able to satisfy the rigorous requirements of the plain-error rule. To establish plain error, a party must demonstrate that there was error, that it was plain in the sense of being obvious, that it affected the party’s substantial rights, and that a failure to correct it would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Here, during the three years between Defendant’s guilty plea and his sentencing, Defendant committed another crime. Base on the new crime, prosecutors withdrew their support for a sentence reduction which they agreed to as part of an earlier agreement. At no time during the sentencing proceeding did defense counsel assert that the government was reneging on its promise. When Defendant raised the issue on appeal, the Fifth Circuit applied the plain error rule and found that Defendant would not have received the reduction even had the government asked for it and thus reversal was not required.
The Supreme Court rejected Defendant’s argument that the prosecutor’s failure to hold up their end of a plea bargain retroactively voids the deal by undermining the knowing and voluntary nature of Defendant’s guilty plea. Although a breach of a plea agreement opens the door to a number of possible remedies, one of which might be rescissions, this is not the same as saying the contract never existed. Defaulting on a plea agreement is also not a “structural” error that is unamenable to harmless-error analysis. Held, judgment of the Fifth Circuit affirmed; Souter and Stevens, JJ., dissenting on basis that the plain error standard applied; however, the harm from the breach in this case certainly cast doubt on the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings, given that people have a right to expect the government to abide by its promises; Souter added that the prejudice should be gauged not by the sentence, but by Defendant’s relinquishment of his trial rights in exchange for an empty promise.
