April 2009 Posts

Traffic stop – officer’s inquiry about presence of gun was constitutional

Delatorre v. State, 49A02-0807-CR-636

2nd Dist., 03-25-09, Ind.App.

Attorney: Ellen O’Connor

Holding: During a traffic stop, a police officer’s inquiry as to whether the car occupants have any weapons is constitutional. A person detained for a traffic stop is not ordinarily “in custody” in the meaning of Miranda. Lockett v. State, 747 N.E.2d 539 (Ind. 2001). Moreover, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit police from routinely inquiring about the presence of weapons. Id. Here, a police officer stopped Defendant who was driving a car with tail lights that were not working. Neither Defendant nor passenger had a driver’s license or identification card. Defendant began speaking to the passenger in Spanish. When the officer asked him to stop speaking in Spanish, Defendant continued to do so. The officer then asked Defendant if he had any weapons, to which Defendant responded there was a gun in the compartment of the driver’s side door. Although the fact that Defendant continued to speak in Spanish after police officer requested him to stop raised the officer’s safety concerns, the officer was not acting discriminately. The officer testified that he always asks about weapons during traffic stops regardless of the race of the occupants. This routine inquiry is constitutional. Thus, trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the gun found in Defendant’s car. Held, judgment affirmed.

Monday, April 27th, 2009 | Posted in Indiana Court of Appeals | No Comments »

School search – unreasoanble at its inception

D.M. v. State, 49A02-0806-JV-480

2nd Dist., 03-05-09, Ind.App. 902 N.E.2d 276

Attorney: Taffanee Keys

Holding: The search of D.M.’s jacket was not justified at its inception because there were no reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search would produce evidence that D.M. violated either the law or school rule. In order for a school search to be reasonable, the action must be justified at its inception and the search as conducted must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. A search by a school official is justified at its inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or school rules. Here, D.M. entered class about one hour late. He told his teacher he had missed his bus. However, the teacher heard him tell another student that he had been shopping earlier that morning and was carrying a “stack.” Although the teacher admitted he had no idea what a “stack” was, drugs and weapons had been discovered on some students at the school earlier in the week. The teacher searched D.M.’s and some other jackets while the students were out of the room. In D.M.’s jacket, the teacher found seventeen credit cards in a woman’s name and keys to a Ford Contour. Because the teacher admittedly had no individualized idea that any jacket may contain contraband and rather randomly searched the jackets because school administrators told him to keep eyes and ears out,” there were no reasonable grounds to search the jacket. Thus, the search of D.M.’s jacket was unreasonable and evidence seized from the jacket was improperly admitted into evidence. Held, judgment reversed and remanded with instructions to vacate D.M.’s delinquency adjudication.

Monday, April 27th, 2009 | Posted in Indiana Court of Appeals | No Comments »

Holding: On rehearing after reversal and remand by the U.S. Supreme Court in Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S.Ct. 2379, 2387-88 (2008), the Indiana Supreme Court held that the record supports trial court’s finding that Defendant suffered from a severe mental illness to the point where he was not competent to conduct trial proceedings by himself. The U.S. Constitution permits States to insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves. Edwards, 128 S.Ct. at 2387-88. Here, in light of Defendant’s request to represent himself at his re-trial on an attempted murder charge, trial court found Defendant competent to stand trial, but not competent to represent himself. Defendant was evaluated by several mental health professionals from 1999 through 2004 and was diagnosed at various points in time with schizophrenia of undifferentiated type, disorganized type schizophrenia, a delusional disorder, and a personality disorder. However, these evaluations were eighteen months prior to Defendant’s trial. And, one other evaluation found that Defendant was free of psychosis, depression, mania and confusion. Although the record contains numerous pleadings written by Defendant that are virtually incomprehensible, several of his motions and in-court colloquies demonstrate lucidity, cooperativeness, and at least a rudimentary understanding of trial practice. However, the totality of the evidence adequately supports trial court’s determination. Trial court had before it the record of erratic performance that gave no confidence that whatever Defendant’s state as of a given moment, it might be a transient condition.

Washington v. State, 79A02-0806-CR-500

2nd Dist., 03-06-09, Ind.App. 902 N.E.2d 280

Attorney: Teri A. Cummins

Holding: Distinguishing Barham v. State, 641 N.E.2d 79 (Ind.Ct.App. 1994), Court found no violation of Defendant’s constitutional right to counsel of his choice where trial court denied his request for a continuance to hire private counsel on the morning of trial. Defendant failed to notify trial court, with any certainty, of the identity of his allegedly hired private counsel, and, as of the morning of trial, no attorney, other than his previously assigned public defender, had filed an appearance on Defendant’s behalf. In addition, Defendant’s public defender was prepared to, and did represent Defendant at trial. In waiting until morning of trial to request a continuance for purpose of hiring private counsel, Defendant failed to exercise his right to hire the counsel of his choice at appropriate stage of proceedings, thus trial court did not interfere unreasonably or arbitrarily with Defendant’s right to hire counsel of his choice. Held, judgment affirmed.

Monday, April 27th, 2009 | Posted in Indiana Court of Appeals | No Comments »

Right to self-representation – competency standard

Edwards v. State, 49S02-0705-CR-202

03-17-09, Ind. 902 N.E.2d 821

Attorney: Michael Fisher

Holding: On rehearing after reversal and remand by the U.S. Supreme Court in Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S.Ct. 2379, 2387-88 (2008), the Indiana Supreme Court held that the record supports trial court’s finding that Defendant suffered from a severe mental illness to the point where he was not competent to conduct trial proceedings by himself. The U.S. Constitution permits States to insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves. Edwards, 128 S.Ct. at 2387-88. Here, in light of Defendant’s request to represent himself at his re-trial on an attempted murder charge, trial court found Defendant competent to stand trial, but not competent to represent himself. Defendant was evaluated by several mental health professionals from 1999 through 2004 and was diagnosed at various points in time with schizophrenia of undifferentiated type, disorganized type schizophrenia, a delusional disorder, and a personality disorder. However, these evaluations were eighteen months prior to Defendant’s trial. And, one other evaluation found that Defendant was free of psychosis, depression, mania and confusion. Although the record contains numerous pleadings written by Defendant that are virtually incomprehensible, several of his motions and in-court colloquies demonstrate lucidity, cooperativeness, and at least a rudimentary understanding of trial practice. However, the totality of the evidence adequately supports trial court’s determination. Trial court had before it the record of erratic performance that gave no confidence that whatever Defendant’s state as of a given moment, it might be a transient condition.

Trial court’s ruling prohibiting Defendant from proceeding pro se did not violate article I, section 13 of the Indiana Constitution, which guarantees an accused the right “to be heard by himself and by counsel.” Although section 13 has been held to provide broader rights than the Sixth Amendment, the right to self-representation of mentally impaired persons under section 13 is no broader than that guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. The accused’s right “to be heard by himself” is not an unlimited right to conduct all trial proceedings on his own. A Defendant’s mental illness may preclude competent self-representation in the interest of a fair trial. Held, judgment affirmed.

Monday, April 27th, 2009 | Posted in Indiana Supreme Court | No Comments »

CHINS – split analysis for each parent

Matter of N.E. v. , 49A02-0806-JV-522

2nd Dist., 03-19-09, Ind.App.

Attorney: Steven J. Halbert

Holding: Juvenile court erred by not stating reasons for its disposition when concluding that N.E. was a CHINS, and evidence did not support a finding that N.E. was a CHINS with respect to Father. Father argued that although N.E. was a CHINS with respect to Mother, she was not a CHINS with respect to him. As in In re C.S., 863 N.E.2d 413 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007), Father lived apart from Mother, who was alleged to have endangered the health or wellbeing of her child. Father sought to demonstrate his ability and willingness to appropriately parent N.E., but had yet to establish paternity by the time that the CHINS petition had been filed against Mother. When juvenile court incorporated findings with respect to Mother and determined that N.E. was a CHINS, it impugned the parenting abilities of Father without specific allegations or specific findings of fact.

Once a non-custodial parent demonstrates that he or she is willing and able to parent the child alleged to be a CHINS, due process requires that the DCS present allegations directed at that parent, which, if provided, would meet the requirements for a CHINS determination under I.C. 31-41-1 if the DCS thinks it is appropriate for the court to intervene in that parent-child relationship. This would require an amendment of existing CHINS petition or filing of a new petition. Thereafter, DCS must prove those allegations by a preponderance of evidence and trial court must make specific findings based on the record concluding that the child is a CHINS. Held, judment reversed and remanded for juvenile court to determine whether Father is willing and able to appropriately parent N.E. since N.E. is a CHINS with respect to Mother; Vaidik, J., dissenting, believes that child is either a CHINS or is not a CHINS, but would remand for new reasoned dispositional order in accordance with I.C. 31-34-19-10.

Monday, April 27th, 2009 | Posted in Indiana Court of Appeals | No Comments »

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