May 2009 Posts

Hayworth v. State, 07A01-0804-CR-197

1st Dist., 04-20-09, Ind.App. 904 N.E.2d 684

Attorney: David C. Grupenhoff

Holding: Trial court erred in admitting evidence seized pursuant to search warrant based on inadequate probable cause, and good faith exception did not apply. An informant who had never given police information in the past alleged that she had been to Defendant’s house within past 72 hours, wanted to turn in an “active meth” lab, and that Defendant was selling the finished product. Totality of circumstances did not corroborate informant’s statements because police did not corroborate any illegal activity by Defendant and only confirmed information that was readily available to the general public, such as her address.

Moreover, although probable cause affidavit states that informant observed criminal activity firsthand, police officer’s testimony at suppression hearing defeats this inference. Officer’s admissions at suppression hearing (i.e., that informant had not told him that she had seen Defendant manufacture or use methamphetamine) amount to deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct. Police officers have a duty and obligation of full and fair disclosure of all material facts when applying for a warrant. Jaggers v. State, 687 N.E.2d 180 (Ind. 1997). Officer’s conduct in this case was sufficiently deliberate that exclusion of evidence will meaningfully deter the misconduct and it is sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by our justice system. See Herring v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 695 (2009). Thus, State has failed to prove that good faith exception applies, and evidence seized pursuant to warrant must be excluded. Held, convictions reversed and remanded.

Friday, May 29th, 2009 | Posted in Indiana Court of Appeals | No Comments »

Taylor v. State, 49A02-0809-CR-795

2nd Dist., 04-07-09, Ind.App. 904 N.E.2d 259

Attorney: Timothy Burns

Holding: Where Defendant agreed to speak with police officers in reference to an ongoing investigation after traffic stop for seatbelt violation had been completed, subsequent patdown was not justified. A vehicle, the contents of a vehicle, the driver of a vehicle, or a passenger in a vehicle may not be inspected, searched, or detained solely because of a violation of the Seatbelt Enforcement Act. I.C. 9-19-10-3.1 Also, where a person who is not under arrest agrees to be transported by an officer, the increased risk of danger to the officer of transporting an individual who might be armed provides sufficient justification for a pat down search of the person under the Indiana Constitution.

Here, Defendant was properly stopped for a seatbelt violation. During the stop, police discovered that a detective wanted to speak with the vehicle occupants about an ongoing investigation. After returning Defendant’s license and registration and telling Defendant he was “free to go,” officer asked Defendant whether he would be willing to go to the police station and speak with the detective about the ongoing investigation. As soon as Defendant agreed, officer did a pat down search for his safety when transporting Defendant and found marijuana. The search did not violate I.C. 9-19-10-3.1 because it was not performed solely because of the seatbelt violation, but rather for the officer’s safety. However, the search violated Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution because Defendant never consented to being transported to the station. Thus, as soon as officer ordered Defendant to put hands on top of head and interlock fingers so officer could perform the pat down, Defendant was unlawfully detained without his consent. Defendant was not under arrest and could have driven himself to the police station to speak with detective. Thus, trial court abused its discretion by admitting marijuana seized from Defendant’s persons. Held, judgment reversed.

Friday, May 29th, 2009 | Posted in Indiana Court of Appeals | No Comments »

Thayer v. State, 55A01-0807-CR-346

1st Dist., 04-24-09, Ind.App. 904 N.E.2d 706

Attorney: Brian J. Johnson

Holding: Police officer had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot during traffic stop, thus brief detention for further investigation was justified under Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11 of Indiana Constitution. After stopping Defendant’s vehicle for tailgating, officer observed that Defendant was sweating profusely, despite air conditioning in his car. Defendant also had a “quiver” in his voice, and his hand was “very shaky” as he handed officer his driver’s license and registration. “Within a few short minutes,” Defendant went from telling officer that he was on a day trip for lunch with a friend in Chicago to stating that he was on a day trip to St. Louis. Defendant also changed his story from not having stayed overnight anywhere to having stayed in a hotel in Effingham, Illinois the night before. In light of those circumstances, officer grew suspicious of Defendant and became concerned for his own safety. When he asked Defendant specifically whether he had any cocaine in his car, Defendant giggled and looked away. As Defendant exited car after consenting to vehicle search, officer observed bulge in Defendant’s pants pocket and performed a pat-down search. When Defendant tried to prevent officer from emptying contents of his bulging pocket, officer drew his weapon, ordered Defendant to ground, and discovered large bag of cocaine in Defendant’s pocket. Court disagreed with Defendant’s argument that officer’s detention and questioning unreasonably delayed duration of stop. Officer was justified in his brief detention of Defendant for further investigation into Defendant’s inconsistent and deceptive statements. Thus, trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. Held, judgment affirmed.

Friday, May 29th, 2009 | Posted in Indiana Court of Appeals | No Comments »

State v. Campbell, 09A02-0901-CR-83

2nd Dist., 04-30-09, Ind.App.

Attorney: Patrick J. Roberts

Holding: Trial court erred in determining that police officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant’s vehicle. Officer received a report from dispatch that a husband had dragged his wife into a white Tahoe at a tavern. Such conduct fits definition of criminal conduct pursuant to I.C. 35-42-3-3(a). Officer investigated the report by driving to tavern and speaking with three people in parking lot, one of whom witnessed the possible crime and provided officer with specific details of what she had observed, Defendant’s first name, town of residence and direction of travel. Such information was adequate to give officers reasonable suspicion to stop the Tahoe for further investigation. The witness’s accurate prediction of the Tahoe’s likely location and direction of travel lent credibility to her information. Held, judgment reversed and remanded.

Friday, May 29th, 2009 | Posted in Indiana Court of Appeals | No Comments »