July 2009 Posts

Safford Unified School District #1 et al v. Redding, 08-479

6-25-09, U.S.

Holding: Because there were no facts that drugs school official suspected child to possess posed a danger to students or that drugs were concealed in her underwear, school officials did not have sufficient suspicion to warrant extending their search of child to the point of making child pull out her underwear. The content of the suspicion failed to match the degree of intrusion. A school search is permissible when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objective so the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). Here, a thirteen-year-old child was suspected of bringing prescription strength ibuprofen and over the counter pain killers to school, which were both banned by school policy. Although a search of the child’s bag and outer clothing was justified by the suspicion, the subsequent search of her bra and underwear, exposing her breasts and some of her pelvic area was not justified. The content of the suspicion failed to match the degree of intrusion. Because school officials knew that the pills were common pain relievers, they must have known of their nature and limited threat and had no reason to suspect that large amounts were being passed around or that individual students had great quantities. Nor could the officials have suspected the child was hiding common painkillers in her underwear. Thus, the strip search of the child was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. However, the school officials were protected from liability by qualified immunity. Held, judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; Thomas, J., DISSENTING on Fourth Amendment issue.

Friday, July 31st, 2009 | Posted in Indiana Supreme Court | No Comments »

District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial District v. Osborne, 08-6

06-18-09, U.S.

Holding: An individual whose criminal conviction has become final does not have a federal constitutional right to gain access to evidence in State’s possession so that it can be subjected to DNA testing to try to prove his innocence. DNA testing provides “an unparalleled ability” to prove innocence or guilt, but its availability “cannot mean that every criminal conviction, or even every criminal conviction involving biological evidence, is suddenly in doubt.” The task of writing rules to control access to DNA evidence belongs primarily to the legislature. There is no reason to constitutionalize access through the courts when elected officials are making a “prompt and considered” response to the DNA phenomenon. Held, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ opinion at 521 F.3d 1118 reversed and remanded. Alito, J., joined by Kennedy, J. and Thomas, J., CONCURRING, stressed possibility that DNA evidence can be contaminated and that the few testing labs that exist are already overburdened; also, a defendant who, “for tactical purposes, passes up the opportunity for DNA testing at trial,…has no constitutional right to demand to perform DNA testing after conviction.” Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, J. and Breyer, J., DISSENTING, said, “When absolute proof of innocence is readily at hand, a State should not shrink from the possibility that error may have occurred.” Souter, J., DISSENTING, would decide case on procedural due process grounds, noting that Alaska’s procedures have proven so inadequate that federal relief is warranted.

Friday, July 31st, 2009 | Posted in Indiana Supreme Court | No Comments »

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal, et. al, 08-22

06-08-09, U.S.

Holding: It was unconstitutional for a state supreme court justice to sit on a case involving the financial interests of a major donor to the judge’s election campaign. Taking into consideration “all of the circumstances of this case,” Court held that probability of actual bias was too high and disqualification was therefore required. The Due Process Clause incorporated the common-law rule requiring recusal when a judge has “a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest” in a case. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), but Court has also identified additional instances which, as an objective matter, require recusal where, as here, “the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision maker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975). Majority rejected arguments that its ruling would bring a train of adverse consequences ranging from a flood of recusal motions to unnecessary interference with judicial elections. “The facts now before us are extreme by any measure. The parties point to no other instance involving judicial campaign contributions that presents a potential for bias comparable to the circumstances in this case.” Held, reversed and remanded. Roberts, C.J., joined by Scalia, J., Thomas, J., and Alito, J., DISSENTING; Scalia, J., DISSENTING.

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Bobby v. Bies, 08-598, 129 S.Ct. ___

06-01-09, U.S.

Holding: A state prisoner who was sentenced to death before Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), outlawed the death penalty for mentally retarded defendants, and whom the state courts acknowledged suffered from a level of mental retardation that had some weight as a mitigating factor, may now be subjected to an Atkins proceeding to determine whether the extent of his mental impairment allows his execution. The State court’s determination that Defendant’s mental retardation was a mitigating factor does not trigger Double Jeopardy Clause’s doctrine of issue preclusion because only prevailing parties may avail themselves of that doctrine and the prisoner was condemned to death the first time around. State did not vigorously contest Defendant’s evidence of mental retardation offered in mitigation at sentencing, but now has a chance to go back and relitigate the matter now that proof of mental retardation precludes imposition of the death penalty. Double Jeopardy preclusion doctrine “does not bar a full airing of the issue whether Bies qualifies as mentally retarded under Atkins.” Court noted that in Atkins, it left it up to the states to devise their own frameworks for determining whether mental retardation renders a particular defendant ineligible for execution. Held, Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ opinion at 519 F.3d 324 reversed and remanded.

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Boyle v. United States, 07-1309, 129 U.S.___

06-08-09, U.S.

Holding: A criminal association-in-fact enterprise under RICO, 18 U.S.C. ‘1962(c), may exist if it has a purpose, sufficient longevity to accomplish that purpose, and relationships among associates–which can be inferred from the underlying acts and without a distinct structural hierarchy or chain of command. The association-in-fact enterprise must have a “structure,” but it need not be, as Defendant sought the jury to be instructed in his prosecution for bank robberies, “an ascertainable structure beyond that inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity in which it engages.” See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1982) (pattern of racketeering activity may sometimes prove the existence of an enterprise). Court rejected Defendant’s argument that its construction would create a merger of the RICO ‘ 1962(c) crime with other federal offenses, pointing out that, in relation to conspiracy, it demands “much more” than proof of a “brief” agreement. Held, Second Circuit District Court opinion at 283 Fed. Appx. 825 affirmed. Stevens, J., joined by Breyer, J., DISSENTING, notes that Congress intended RICO enterprises to refer to business-like organizations that exist apart from predicate acts committed by their associates; thus, government should be required to “adduce other evidence of the entity’s ’separate’ existence and ‘ongoing organization.’”

Friday, July 31st, 2009 | Posted in Indiana Supreme Court | No Comments »