Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal, et. al, 08-22
06-08-09, U.S.
Holding: It was unconstitutional for a state supreme court justice to sit on a case involving the financial interests of a major donor to the judge’s election campaign. Taking into consideration “all of the circumstances of this case,” Court held that probability of actual bias was too high and disqualification was therefore required. The Due Process Clause incorporated the common-law rule requiring recusal when a judge has “a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest” in a case. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), but Court has also identified additional instances which, as an objective matter, require recusal where, as here, “the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision maker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975). Majority rejected arguments that its ruling would bring a train of adverse consequences ranging from a flood of recusal motions to unnecessary interference with judicial elections. “The facts now before us are extreme by any measure. The parties point to no other instance involving judicial campaign contributions that presents a potential for bias comparable to the circumstances in this case.” Held, reversed and remanded. Roberts, C.J., joined by Scalia, J., Thomas, J., and Alito, J., DISSENTING; Scalia, J., DISSENTING.
