July 2009 Posts

Yeager v. United States, 08-67, 129 S.Ct.___

06-18-09, U.S.

Holding: If a jury finds an individual guilty on some counts, but can’t agree on others, prosecutors may not try that individual again on the “hung” counts if they had a common element with those on which the jury acquitted. Double Jeopardy Clause precludes government from relitigating any issue that was necessarily decided by a jury’s acquittal in a prior trial. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). Here, Defendant was acquitted of securities fraud, but the jury was unable to reach a verdict on insider trading and money laundering counts. The government re-indicted Defendant on the hung counts, and Defendant moved to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. In determining what a jury “necessarily decided,” judges must scan the record to decide “whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.” Id. Although Ashe involved an acquittal on a single-count indictment, the Ashe approach is not rendered inapplicable by the existence of other charges on which the jury deadlocked. The lower courts should not have considered the jury’s failure to reach a verdict when assessing which issues the jury’s acquittals necessarily resolved. Held, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ opinion at 521 F.3d 367 reversed and remanded to revisit its factual determination regarding whether jury necessarily resolved in Defendant’s favor an issue of ultimate fact on fraud counts that government would have to prove in order to convict him of insider trading. Kennedy, J., CONCURRING IN PART AND CONCURRING IN JUDGMENT; Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., and Alito, J., DISSENTING, argued that the Ashe approach should not be extended to cases involving deadlocked juries; Alito, J., joined by Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., DISSENTING.

Note: This case represents a more expansive interpretation of the collateral estoppel component of the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause. Distinguishing United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984), a case involving inconsistent verdicts, Court emphasized that a hung jury, unlike a verdict, is a “nonevent” that cannot support conclusions about what jurors thought. Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317 (1984), which held that Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a retrial on charges on which a jury deadlocked, is limited to situation where a defendant claims that hung counts, standing alone, have a preclusive effect.

Friday, July 31st, 2009 | Posted in Indiana Supreme Court | No Comments »

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusettes, 129 S.Ct. ___

6-22-09, U.S.

Holding: The Sixth Amendment requires that a lab chemist be called to testify in order to admit the lab results into evidence in a trial. A witness’s testimony against a defendant is inadmissible unless the witness appears at trial or, if the witness is unavailable, the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). Testimonial statements include “ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.” Id. at 51-52. Here, in a drug prosecution, the State submitted lab reports instead of live testimony of the lab analyst to establish the identity and weight of the cocaine at issue. The lab reports were sworn to before a notary public by analysts at the State Lab and were conclusory in that they identified the material tested as cocaine of a certain weight. The reports were made in response to a police request, and even if they were volunteered, it would not make the reports any less testimonial. These lab reports were affidavits in which the lab analyst provides the precise testimony that he or she would be expected to provide if called at trial. These lab reports are functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, and thus, are testimonial. Moreover, citing to the National Academy of Sciences’ Report, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward 6-1, the Court reasons that scientific testing by labs run by law enforcement agencies is not as neutral or reliable as the dissent suggests. Like expert witnesses generally, an analyst=s lack of proper training or deficiency in judgment may be disclosed in cross-examination. Thus, the Sixth Amendment does not permit the prosecution to prove its case via ex parte out of-of-court affidavits, and the admission of the laboratory reports was unconstitutional. Held, judgment of Massachusetts Court of Appeals at 870 N.E.2d 676, reversed and remanded; Thomas, J., CONCURRING WITH SEPARATE OPINION; Kennedy, J., DISSENTING with whom Roberts, C.J., Breyer and Alito, J.J, concur.

NOTE: The Indiana Supreme Court’s burden-switching to the Defendant to prove a State’s witness unavailable in order to support a Sixth Amendment objection is erroneous. See Fowler v. State, 829 N.E.2d 459 (Ind. 2005). The Melendez-Diaz Court holds that “[c]onverting the prosecution’s duty under the Confrontation Clause into the defendant’s privilege under state law or the Compulsory Process Clause shift the consequences of adverse-witness no-shows from the State to the accused. More fundamentally, the Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those adverse witnesses into court. Its value to the defendant is not replaced by a system in which the prosecution presents its evidence via ex parte affidavits and waits for the defendant to subpoena the affiants if he chooses.”

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Jackson v. State, 48S02-0809-CR-513

06-30-09, Ind.

Attorney: Anthony Lawrence

Holding: The search of Defendant’s home was valid under the good faith exception to the warrant requirement. The exclusionary rule does not require the suppression of evidence obtained in reliance on a defective search warrant if the police relied on the warrant in objective good faith. But, the good faith exception is not available where the warrant was based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Here, at a hearing for a search warrant, an officer testified that he had received several complaints from the public about heavy traffic from Defendant’s home. Also, a confidential informant claimed Defendant was selling drugs from his residence. The informant had made several buys for the drug task force on which charges had not yet been filed. The trial court issued a search warrant, and the police found marijuana and a gun in the home. Assuming without deciding that probable cause did not exist to support issuing a warrant to search Defendant’s home, the officer’s testimony was not so bare bones and lacking in indicia of probable cause as to make reliance upon the resulting warrant objectively unreasonable. The officer set forth the nature of his relationship with the informant through prior controlled buys and bolstered the informant’s tip by testifying to complaints about heavy traffic from the home. Acknowledging the officer’s testimony is abbreviated and public complaints have their limitations, the totality of the circumstances illustrate enough evidence before the issuing court that would allow the court to make the call of probable cause. Held, transfer granted, judgment of trial court affirmed and Court of Appeals’ opinion at 889 N.E.2d 830 vacated and reversed.

Friday, July 31st, 2009 | Posted in Indiana Supreme Court | No Comments »