Duran v. State, 4A03-0811-CR-569
3rd Dist., 07-23-09, Ind.App.
Attorney: Alison Benjamin; Paul Stracci
Holding: Trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. Police officers may enter a dwelling if the evidence establishes the officers reasonably believed the following: 1) that the arrestee resided at the dwelling and 2) that the arrestee was at the dwelling at the time of the entry. U.S. v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256, 1263 (11th Cir. 2000). Here, when police attempted to serve Hernandez with an arrest warrant at the address listed on the warrant, Hernandez’s mother explained that he no longer resided at her house. Hernandez had allegedly stole a vehicle and was injured when he crashed the vehicle during a police chase. Another officer told the officer looking for Hernandez that he had given Hernandez, who was in crutches, a ride from the hospital to a certain apartment complex a few days earlier and prior to the arrest warrant. Both officers then went to the apartment building and spoke with a man who claimed to know Hernandez. This man told the police that Hernandez lived in the only apartment with a green door on the second floor. When the police knocked on the door, the person inside asked “who is it?” to which the police identified themselves. The person then said “Hold on a minute” and the police heard “shuffling around” inside of the apartment followed by silence. So, the police kicked down the door with guns drawn and found Defendant in the entryway. Defendant told the police that Hernandez did not live there and they could search for him. The police found cocaine on a window sill. Hernandez lived in a different apartment on the second floor. Because the unidentified man who told police where Hernandez lived is more of a cooperative citizen than a professional informant, it was reasonable for the police to rely on his assertion that Hernandez lived in the green-door apartment. Given Hernandez’s status as an arrestee, his relative immobility, the man’s non-responsiveness to the officers’ knocks despite telling the officers to hold on a minute and the “shuffling around” from inside the apartment, the officers would have reasonably concluded that the man was Hernandez or that he was helping Hernandez hide. Thus, trial court was within its discretion when it concluded the officers’ entry did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, although the kicking down of Defendant’s door was a substantial intrusion, the police had a reasonable belief that Hernandez was inside the apartment and the entry was consistent with law enforcement needs, thus justifying the entry under the Indiana Constitution. Held, judgment affirmed; Darden, J., dissenting on basis that he is deeply troubled by testimony indicating that police officers believe that when the resident of a dwelling does not open a door, after having simply heard the announcement that “police” are outside, the officers may kick in that door to gain entry.
