Holly v. State, 49S01-0811-CR-591
12-18-09, Ind.
Attorney: Timothy Burns
Holding: Trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. An officer has reasonable suspicion to initiate a Terry stop when: (1) the officer knows that the registered owner of a vehicle has a suspended license and (2) the officer is unaware of any evidence or circumstances which indicate that the owner is not the driver of the vehicle. However, once it becomes apparent that the driver of the vehicle is not the owner, then an officer simply has no reason to conduct additional inquiry. Reasonable suspicion to pull a car over does not confer unconditional authority to request the driver’s license and registration. Here, the officer ran a license plate check on the car traveling in front of him and discovered that it was registered to an African-American female who had a suspended license. The officer did not have a chance to observe the driver before initiating the stop. However, when the officer approached the driver, he realized the driver was a man and thus not the owner of the car. Regardless, the officer asked for the driver and the passenger’s identification, and learned that everyone in the car had suspended licenses. The officer then searched the car and found a small amount of marijuana. Although the initial stop was justified by reasonable suspicion that the driver was driving while suspended, there is nothing in the record justifying the further inquiry. The officer had no justification to pursue an investigatory stop that extended to a request to see Defendant’s identification. Thus, the evidence collected as a result of the stop, including marijuana , was inadmissible under the Fourth Amendment. Held, transfer granted, Court of Appeals’ opinion at 888 N.E.2d 338 vacated, judgment reversed; Shepard, C.J., dissenting on basis that the officer executed a valid traffic stop and his request for identification was still within the routine procedures of standard stops; Sullivan, J., dissenting on basis that the officer’s check on the status of Defendant’s license constituted a very limited further encroachment upon any privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment.
