Armfield v. State, 29S02-0811-CR-590

12-18-09, Ind.

Attorney: Taffanee Keys

Holding: Trial court properly denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress. Resolving a split in the appellate courts, Court held that an officer has reasonable suspicion to initiate a Terry stop when: (1) the officer knows that the registered owner of a vehicle has a suspended license and (2) the officer is unaware of any evidence or circumstances which indicate that the owner is not the driver of the vehicle. This rule does not require officers to match the physical description of the registered owner from the license plate check to the driver of the vehicle before initiating a Terry stop. To the extent that prior opinions of the Court of Appeals are inconsistent, such as Holly v. State, 888 N.E.2d 338, aff’d on other grounds, and Wilkinson v. State, 743 N.E.2d 1267, the Court disapproves of them.

Here, an officer ran a license plate check on Defendant’s vehicle while driving behind him at 12:30 a.m. The check revealed that the owner of the vehicle had a lifetime license suspension. It also revealed the name, address and physical description of the owner. The officer stopped the vehicle. When he approached the driver, he asked if he was Thomas, to which Defendant responded affirmatively. Defendant again identified himself as Thomas Armfield and gave his birth date. The officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the car, and acted properly when he approached the vehicle and verified the name of the driver matched that of the registered owner. Held, transfer granted, judgment affirmed.

Holly v. State, 49S01-0811-CR-591

12-18-09, Ind.

Attorney: Timothy Burns

Holding: Trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. An officer has reasonable suspicion to initiate a Terry stop when: (1) the officer knows that the registered owner of a vehicle has a suspended license and (2) the officer is unaware of any evidence or circumstances which indicate that the owner is not the driver of the vehicle. However, once it becomes apparent that the driver of the vehicle is not the owner, then an officer simply has no reason to conduct additional inquiry. Reasonable suspicion to pull a car over does not confer unconditional authority to request the driver’s license and registration. Here, the officer ran a license plate check on the car traveling in front of him and discovered that it was registered to an African-American female who had a suspended license. The officer did not have a chance to observe the driver before initiating the stop. However, when the officer approached the driver, he realized the driver was a man and thus not the owner of the car. Regardless, the officer asked for the driver and the passenger’s identification, and learned that everyone in the car had suspended licenses. The officer then searched the car and found a small amount of marijuana. Although the initial stop was justified by reasonable suspicion that the driver was driving while suspended, there is nothing in the record justifying the further inquiry. The officer had no justification to pursue an investigatory stop that extended to a request to see Defendant’s identification. Thus, the evidence collected as a result of the stop, including marijuana , was inadmissible under the Fourth Amendment. Held, transfer granted, Court of Appeals’ opinion at 888 N.E.2d 338 vacated, judgment reversed; Shepard, C.J., dissenting on basis that the officer executed a valid traffic stop and his request for identification was still within the routine procedures of standard stops; Sullivan, J., dissenting on basis that the officer’s check on the status of Defendant’s license constituted a very limited further encroachment upon any privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment.

Lafayette v. State, 45S03-0904-CR-182

12-08-09, Ind.

Attorney: Mark A. Bates

Holding: In rape prosecution, trial court erred in admitting testimony about Defendant’s prior attempted rape conviction under the intent exception to Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b), because Defendant did not present a claim of particular contrary intent by claiming intercourse was consensual and by challenging complaining witness’s (CW’s) credibility on the issue of consent.

Evidence of prior crimes may not be used to prove a defendant’s character in order to show he acted in accord with that character, but such evidence may be admissible for other purposes, such as proving intent. Ind. Evid. R. 404(b). However, the intent exception is available only when a defendant goes beyond merely denying the charged culpability and alleges a particular contrary intent. Wickizer v. State, 626 N.E.2d 795 (Ind. 1993). Where State establishes that a defendant alleges a particular contrary intent, the evidence is still not admissible until trial court determines that the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Id. The evidence has substantial probative value if it is specifically and significantly related to the charged crime in time, place, and circumstance as to be logically relevant to one of the particular excepted purposes. Malone v. State, 441 N.E.2d 1339 (Ind. 1982).

Here, after Defendant cross examined CW, trial court ruled that he opened the door to admission of his attempted rape conviction when he attacked the credibility of CW on the issue of whether the intercourse was consensual. In reversing the trial court, Court held that Defendant’s claim that the intercourse was consensual does not present a claim of particular contrary intent for purposes of the intent exception to Evidence Rule 404(b). Such a claim actually puts the alleged victim’s intent in issue. Moreover, a defendant does not put his intent at issue by questioning the alleged victim’s credibility. A contrary rule would prevent defendants from exercising the right to confront a witness’s credibility. Held, transfer granted, Court of Appeals’ opinion at 899 N.E.2d 376 vacated, conviction reversed and remanded for new trial.