Indiana Supreme Court

Armfield v. State, 29S02-0811-CR-590

12-18-09, Ind.

Attorney: Taffanee Keys

Holding: Trial court properly denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress. Resolving a split in the appellate courts, Court held that an officer has reasonable suspicion to initiate a Terry stop when: (1) the officer knows that the registered owner of a vehicle has a suspended license and (2) the officer is unaware of any evidence or circumstances which indicate that the owner is not the driver of the vehicle. This rule does not require officers to match the physical description of the registered owner from the license plate check to the driver of the vehicle before initiating a Terry stop. To the extent that prior opinions of the Court of Appeals are inconsistent, such as Holly v. State, 888 N.E.2d 338, aff’d on other grounds, and Wilkinson v. State, 743 N.E.2d 1267, the Court disapproves of them.

Here, an officer ran a license plate check on Defendant’s vehicle while driving behind him at 12:30 a.m. The check revealed that the owner of the vehicle had a lifetime license suspension. It also revealed the name, address and physical description of the owner. The officer stopped the vehicle. When he approached the driver, he asked if he was Thomas, to which Defendant responded affirmatively. Defendant again identified himself as Thomas Armfield and gave his birth date. The officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the car, and acted properly when he approached the vehicle and verified the name of the driver matched that of the registered owner. Held, transfer granted, judgment affirmed.

Monday, March 1st, 2010 | Posted in Indiana Supreme Court | No Comments »

Holly v. State, 49S01-0811-CR-591

12-18-09, Ind.

Attorney: Timothy Burns

Holding: Trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. An officer has reasonable suspicion to initiate a Terry stop when: (1) the officer knows that the registered owner of a vehicle has a suspended license and (2) the officer is unaware of any evidence or circumstances which indicate that the owner is not the driver of the vehicle. However, once it becomes apparent that the driver of the vehicle is not the owner, then an officer simply has no reason to conduct additional inquiry. Reasonable suspicion to pull a car over does not confer unconditional authority to request the driver’s license and registration. Here, the officer ran a license plate check on the car traveling in front of him and discovered that it was registered to an African-American female who had a suspended license. The officer did not have a chance to observe the driver before initiating the stop. However, when the officer approached the driver, he realized the driver was a man and thus not the owner of the car. Regardless, the officer asked for the driver and the passenger’s identification, and learned that everyone in the car had suspended licenses. The officer then searched the car and found a small amount of marijuana. Although the initial stop was justified by reasonable suspicion that the driver was driving while suspended, there is nothing in the record justifying the further inquiry. The officer had no justification to pursue an investigatory stop that extended to a request to see Defendant’s identification. Thus, the evidence collected as a result of the stop, including marijuana , was inadmissible under the Fourth Amendment. Held, transfer granted, Court of Appeals’ opinion at 888 N.E.2d 338 vacated, judgment reversed; Shepard, C.J., dissenting on basis that the officer executed a valid traffic stop and his request for identification was still within the routine procedures of standard stops; Sullivan, J., dissenting on basis that the officer’s check on the status of Defendant’s license constituted a very limited further encroachment upon any privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment.

Monday, March 1st, 2010 | Posted in Indiana Supreme Court | No Comments »

Lafayette v. State, 45S03-0904-CR-182

12-08-09, Ind.

Attorney: Mark A. Bates

Holding: In rape prosecution, trial court erred in admitting testimony about Defendant’s prior attempted rape conviction under the intent exception to Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b), because Defendant did not present a claim of particular contrary intent by claiming intercourse was consensual and by challenging complaining witness’s (CW’s) credibility on the issue of consent.

Evidence of prior crimes may not be used to prove a defendant’s character in order to show he acted in accord with that character, but such evidence may be admissible for other purposes, such as proving intent. Ind. Evid. R. 404(b). However, the intent exception is available only when a defendant goes beyond merely denying the charged culpability and alleges a particular contrary intent. Wickizer v. State, 626 N.E.2d 795 (Ind. 1993). Where State establishes that a defendant alleges a particular contrary intent, the evidence is still not admissible until trial court determines that the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Id. The evidence has substantial probative value if it is specifically and significantly related to the charged crime in time, place, and circumstance as to be logically relevant to one of the particular excepted purposes. Malone v. State, 441 N.E.2d 1339 (Ind. 1982).

Here, after Defendant cross examined CW, trial court ruled that he opened the door to admission of his attempted rape conviction when he attacked the credibility of CW on the issue of whether the intercourse was consensual. In reversing the trial court, Court held that Defendant’s claim that the intercourse was consensual does not present a claim of particular contrary intent for purposes of the intent exception to Evidence Rule 404(b). Such a claim actually puts the alleged victim’s intent in issue. Moreover, a defendant does not put his intent at issue by questioning the alleged victim’s credibility. A contrary rule would prevent defendants from exercising the right to confront a witness’s credibility. Held, transfer granted, Court of Appeals’ opinion at 899 N.E.2d 376 vacated, conviction reversed and remanded for new trial.

Monday, March 1st, 2010 | Posted in Indiana Supreme Court | No Comments »

Cooper v. State, 49S02-0904-CR-135

12-09-09, Ind.

Attorney: Ann M. Sutton; Bryan Lee Ciyou

Holding: A defendant must file either a notice of appeal or a motion to correct error no later than thirty days after a final appealable order is issued. Ind. Appellate Rule 9(A)(1). However, an appellate court has inherent authority to review an untimely appeal where the appeal qualifies as a rare and exceptional case of great public importance. See Lugar v. State ex rel. Lee, 270 Ind. 45, 383 N.E.2d 287 (1978). Here, trial court deprived Defendant of due process when it revoked his probation based solely on probable cause affidavit, without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Defendant did not file a motion to correct error or a notice of appeal but filed a motion to reconsider the probation revocation after the State dismissed new charges underlying the revocation. Although Defendant timely appealed the denial of his motion to reconsider, he used the appeal to argue that the initial revocation was improper because he was denied the right to due process.

Court held that Defendant’s failure to timely appeal the probation revocation was fatal to his appeal. Revoking probation without providing even the most rudimentary due process rights is not a rare and exceptional case of great public interest under Lugar to allow appellate review despite Defendant’s untimely appeal. Thus, only trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to reconsider was reviewable on appeal.

Dismissal of charges underlying the revocation was inconsequential. A trial court may still revoke probation even when a defendant has been acquitted of the charges providing the basis for the revocation. Brown v. State, 458 N.E.2d 245 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). Because arrest was reasonable and there was probable cause that Defendant committed the offenses, evidence was sufficient to support trial court’s denial of Cooper’s motion to reconsider. Brooks v. State, 692 N.E.2d 951 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). Held, transfer granted, Court of Appeals’ opinion at 894 N.E.2d 993 vacated, judgment affirmed. Boehm, J., dissenting, would entertain merits of appeal pursuant to Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 2.

Monday, March 1st, 2010 | Posted in Indiana Supreme Court | No Comments »

State v. Haldeman, 55S00-0906-CR-266

01-15-10, Ind.

Attorney: Terry Iacoli

Holding: Repealing of I.C. § 35-33.5-1-1, which required State to seek ex parte de novo review from Court of Appeals before implementing wiretap warrants, did not invalidate Criminal Rule 25 and the process it established to seek and obtain such appellate review, even though Criminal Rule 25 was promulgated at the behest of the now repealed statute. The power to rescind a rule governing practice and procedure in Indiana courts lies with the Indiana Supreme Court, not the legislature, and the Court did not, in fact, rescind or modify Cr 25 in response to the legislature’s decision to repeal I.c. 35-33.5-1-1. Criminal Rule 25, in part, requires that a prosecutor file a petition for review of the warrant for wiretap with the court of appeals within ten days of the issuance of the warrant. By not seeking preliminary appellate review of the wiretap, the State violated Criminal Rule 25. However, trial court should not have granted Defendants’ motions to suppress, as neither motion claimed the State’s failure to follow Criminal Rule 25 affected their substantial rights or that the warrants were deficient in any other way. The error was harmless. See Trial Rule 61. Held, transfer granted, denial of motion to suppress affirmed.

Friday, February 26th, 2010 | Posted in Indiana Supreme Court | No Comments »