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Guilty plea precludes PCR on claim of actual innocence

Norris v. State, 43S03-0807-CR-379

11-12-08, Ind.

Attorney: Nancy A. McClaslin

Holding: A guilty plea may not be challenged in post-conviction proceedings by a claim of newly discovered evidence regarding the events that constituted the crime. Indiana requires a factual basis for a guilty plea, and judge may not accept a guilty plea while a defendant claims actual innocence. Ross v. State, 456 N.E.2d 420 (Ind. 1983). Moreover, a guilty plea conclusively establishes the fact of guilt, a prerequisite for imposition of criminal punishment.

In holding that a guilty plea forecloses a post-conviction challenge to the facts established by trial court’s acceptance of guilty plea and resulting conviction, Court cited P-C R. 1(8), which provides that post-conviction relief generally may not be based upon any “ground…knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction.” In establishing extraordinary remedy of post-conviction relief, Court intended the phrase “material facts, not previously presented and heard,” in P-C R. 1(a)(4), to refer to evidentiary facts presented to trial court and which had a sufficient causative effect on resulting determination of guilt.

Here, after Defendant pled guilty to child molesting, complaining witness’s (CW’s) mother submitted affidavit recanting her previous claim that Defendant molested CW. Defendant also submitted psychological report indicating low to borderline range of intellectual functioning. Rather than asking to set aside his guilty plea and proceed to trial, Defendant sought to vacate his conviction. The issue of whether Defendant’s plea was knowing and voluntary was not presented. When trial court accepted Defendant’s guilty plea, he waived the right to present evidence regarding his guilt or innocence.

Held, transfer granted, Court of Appeals’ opinion at 881 N.E.2d 691 vacated, denial of post-conviction relief affirmed.

Boehm and Rucker, JJ., concurring in result, disagree with majority’s holding that a guilty plea precludes a court from granting post-conviction relief on a claim of actual innocence. “Any system of justice must allow for correction of injustice based on clear and convincing evidence of innocence, even if the defendant can be said to have contributed to his own plight by pleading guilty.” See Sanchez v. State, 749 N.E.2d 509, 515 (Ind. 2001); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993). Further, Post-Conviction Rule 1(a)(4) acknowledges the need for relief on a showing of “evidence of material facts, not previously mentioned and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice.”

50-year sentence for child molesting inappropriate

Mishler v. State, 20A03-0712-CR-577

3rd Dist., 10-23-08, Ind.App. 894 N.E.2d 1095

Attorney: Juan Garcia, Jr.

Holding: Fifty-year aggregate sentence for two class A felony child molesting convictions was inappropriate in light of nature of offenses and Defendant’s character. Defendant, who was living with CW, committed at least two episodes of molestation against CW that involved multiple sex acts. Defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana in 1997 and had a probation violation for that offense. Defendant also had a juvenile adjudication in 1991 for three acts that would be child molestation if they had been committed by an adult, and underwent counseling on two separate occasions. Although Defendant’s acts were “monstrous,” Court could not say that, standing alone, they “demonstrate a character of such recalcitrance or depravity that [it] justif[ies] a [maximum sentence].” Hollin v. State, 877 N.E.2d 462 (Ind. 2007). Counsel for State conceded at oral argument that Defendant can probably not be considered among the worst offenders in light of his limited criminal history and amount of time that has passed since juvenile adjudications. Held, judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions to revise Defendant’s sentence to thirty-eight years.

Probation revocation – denial of due process

Tillberry v. State, 49A05-0803-CR-145

5th Dist., 10-31-08, Ind.App. 895 N.E.2d 411

Attorney: Timothy J. Burns

Holding: Both federal law and I.C. 35-38-2-3 require trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing, the State to prove probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence, and requires evidence be presented in open court to allow confrontation and cross-examination. See I.C. 35-38-2-3; Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). Here, Defendant’s “hearing,” which consisted of an informal conversation between the judge and parties at hearing on State’s Notice of Probation Violation, did not comport with due process. Dalton v. State, 560 N.E.2d 558 (Ind.Ct.App. 1990). Moreover, as in Weatherly v. State, 564 N.E.2d 350 (Ind.Ct.App. 1990), State did not provide any evidence to support the revocation or circumstances leading to Defendant’s arrest for possession of marijuana allegedly committed while on probation. To find Defendant “failed to show up for probation appointments,” trial court had to assume facts that were not in evidence. Although Defendant did not object at revocation hearing to manner in which trial court conducted the hearing, deprivation of due process is fundamental error. Goodwin v. State, 783 N.E.2d 686 (Ind. 2003). Held, probation revocation reversed.

Revoking probation prior to its commencement is proper

Baker v. State, 85A04-0807-CR-392

4th Dist.; 10-15-08, Ind.App. 894 N.E.2d 594

Attorney: Craig Persinger

Holding: Trial court did not err in revoking Defendant’s probation while Defendant was serving his executed sentence. Trial court may revoke probation before the defendant enters the probationary phase of his sentence. Ashba v. State, 570 N.E.2d 937 (Ind.Ct.app. 1991), aff’d 580 N.E.2d 244 (Ind. 1991); see also Johnson v. State, 606 N.E2.d 881 (Ind.Ct.App. 1993) and Gardner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 398 (Ind.Ct.App. 1997). Court found no reason to stray from well-established precedent that a defendant’s probationary period begins immediately after sentencing.

Here, Defendant was sentenced to two concurrent sentences of five years with two years suspended and on probation. While waiting to be transported to DOC, Defendant battered another inmate. Trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered the two-year suspended sentence executed. Trial court was well within its discretion in doing so. Held, judgment affirmed.

Position of trust aggravator proper in neglect of dependent sentence

Robinson v. State, 26A01-0804-CR-178

1st Dist.; 10-15-08, Ind.App. 894 N.E.2d 1038

Attorney: Lisa Moody

Holding: Imposition of advisory sentence, based on Defendant’s position of trust with the victim, was appropriate. It is proper for trial courts to consider the particularized individual circumstances of the crime as an aggravating factor. Townsend v. State, 498 N.E.2d 1198, 1201 (Ind. 1986). Here, Defendant was convicted of Neglect of a Dependant as a Class A felony. After Defendant gave birth in her basement, she wrapped the baby in a blanket and left it. Two days later, the baby was discovered dead. In finding Defendant’s position of care over the newborn baby an aggravator, trial court explained that “it isn’t simply a question of being under 12. We’re talking about a victim who is as vulnerable as a human being can be. . . a victim who is completely defenseless.” Reviewing trial court’s articulation of why it was applying the aggravator that the victim was in Defendant’s care in its entirety, it is clear that trial court was addressing the particularized individual circumstances that the newborn was more vulnerable than other potential victims protected by the neglect of a dependent statute. The advisory sentence was appropriate. Held, judgment affirmed.

NOTE: Court did not address the effect of Pedraza v. State, 887N.E.2d 77 (Ind. 2008), holding that trial court can use an element of the crime as an aggravator under the advisory sentencing scheme, although the resulting sentence may be inappropriate.